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Abstract: This paper revisits the role of sectors in aggregate convergence.  The existing evidence is 
inconclusive because its methodology depends sensitively on the conversion factor used to compare 
sectoral productivity levels across countries.  This paper proposes a robust methodology -- β-
decomposition -- to directly estimate how much the productivity growth in each sector and between-
sector restructuring contribute to convergence.  This methodology avoids the sectoral PPP-conversion-
factor problem because it compares only sectoral growth rates and shares -- not levels -- across countries.  
The evidence suggests that productivity growth in both manufacturing and services were important in 
driving aggregate productivity convergence among the OECD countries.   
The results are robust to the choice of base year. 
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Did the manufacturing sector contribute to convergence in aggregate output per worker among the
OECD countries? How big were the contributions of productivity growth and industrial restructur-
ing to convergence? To answer these questions, I propose a methodology that directly decomposes
aggregate productivity convergence into a component due to sectoral productivity growth, a compo-
nent due to restructuring across broadly deﬁned sectors, and a component due to their covariance.
It turns out that productivity growth in both manufacturing and services contributed importantly
to aggregate convergence, i.e., poorer countries enjoyed faster productivity growth in both man-
ufacturing and services. Speciﬁcally, they accounted for about 40% of the tendency to converge.
However, the contribution from between-sector reallocations was small, i.e., poorer countries expe-
rienced only slightly faster ﬂow of employment into the more productive sectors. It accounted for
slightly more than 10% of aggregate convergence.
Bernard and Jones (1996a, 1996b) study a related problem: they ask whether sectoral produc-
tivity converged as aggregate productivity did among fourteen OECD countries during 1970–1987.
Their evidence suggests that while labor productivity and multifactor productivity converged in
services, they showed no sign of convergence in manufacturing. Speciﬁcally, when they regress
productivity growth on the logarithm of initial productivity at the sectoral level, they ﬁnd an eco-
nomically large and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the initial productivity for services, but
not for manufacturing. Consequently, Bernard and Jones (1996b) conclude that it was the service
sector, not manufacturing, that drove aggregate productivity convergence.1
1However, applying the same method to U.S. states and industries, Bernard and Jones (1996c) ﬁnd that it was
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector that drove cross-state convergence. However, their results are diﬃcult
to interpret because they also ﬁnd a number of counter-intuitive results because of measurement error. For example,
they ﬁnd that during 1963–1989, the states that have a large mining sector are the most productive in all sectors.
Also, they ﬁnd that in the aggregate, employment tend to shift from more productive sectors to less productive ones.
More importantly, their analysis depends on the arbitrary choice of a benchmark/lead state, to which all states are
assumed to converge to.
2However, there are theoretical reasons to expect the manufacturing sector to drive convergence.
A large literature has come to regard embodied technology – such as trade and equipment invest-
ment – as the key to economic growth (e.g., see Coe and Helpman (1995), Frankel and Romer
(1999), Delong and Summers (1991)). Embodied technology enables fast catch-up from “relative
backwardness” through cheap technological imitation rather than through costly innovation (e.g.,
see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997)). To the extent that manufacturing processes tend become
standardized and their technology embodied, the manufacturing sector appears to be the perfect
sector for catch-up growth and should therefore contribute to convergence.
Empirically, the established evidence of nonconvergence in manufacturing stated by Bernard
and Jones (1996b) is inconclusive for two reasons. First, Sørensen (2001) argues that Bernard
and Jones’s (1996b) results are not robust because they convert sectoral productivity levels across
countries using expenditure purchasing-power parities (PPPs) designed for total GDP. In particular,
he shows that the convergence property of the manufacturing sector depends crucially on the
choice of base year.2 Thus, whether the manufacturing sector contributed to aggregate convergence
remains uncertain. With the existing methodology, these questions cannot be addressed until the
proper conversion factors for individual sectors become available.3
Second, by focusing on convergence within each sector, the existing methodology ignores the
eﬀect on aggregate convergence due to changes in economic structure. Absent market imperfections,
economists expect factors of production to move from the less productive sectors to the more
productive. Thus, the more productive sectors expand while the less productive ones contract.
2He devises several consistency tests based on the following necessary condition: if the proper conversion factors
were used, measured relative productivity levels and thereby the results for convergence should be unaﬀected by the
choice of base year, i.e., the year in which the ﬁxed prices originate. Convergence in total industry and services did
pass his consistency tests. However, he notes that simply because a set of conversion factors passes the consistency
check does not mean that the conversion factors are valid, as his consistency tests are not based on suﬃcient condition.
3“...research relying on international comparisons of sectoral productivity and income should proceed with caution
until these conversion factors [appropriate for converting sectoral outputs] are available” (Bernard and Jones, 2001,
p.1169). See OECD (1996) for a review of the alternative approaches to measure the aggregate and sectoral conversion
factors. As far as I know, there has not been any signiﬁcant breakthrough in this ﬁeld.
3Even if a sector shows no sign of productivity convergence, it could still contribute to aggregate
convergence through economic restructuring, freeing resources for the more productive sectors.
In fact, the most notable trends in the OECD countries in the postwar period are a rise of the
service sector and a decline of the manufacturing. Thus, the existing estimates only provide partial
measures of aggregate productivity convergence.
Recent studies that use micro ﬁrm-level data have found continuous and large-scale reallocation
of outputs and inputs between producers within narrowly deﬁned industries in manufacturing
that contributes signiﬁcantly to productivity growth.4 The evidence is more limited for services.
However, the available evidence suggests that the contributions of reallocation and net entry appear
to be even greater in selected service industries (see for example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan
(2000) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for reviews). Although this literature also suggests that
the amount of reallocation across sectors appears to be smaller, whether between-sector reallocation
contributes to convergence is an empirical issue that has not been addressed.5
This paper proposes a methodology – ¯-decomposition – that simultaneously addresses the
two empirical issues highlighted above. The proposed method combines Maddison’s (1952) shift-
share decomposition with the convergence regression. Instead of asking whether productivity con-
verges in each sector and then inferring each sector’s contribution to aggregate convergence, the
¯-decomposition methodology I propose directly estimates how much each sector contributes to ag-
gregate convergence. By examining the sectoral contributions to aggregate convergence, this paper
ﬁlls the gap between the micro literature studying longitudinal ﬁrm-level productivity dispersion
and the macro literature on aggregate productivity convergence.
4For example, “for the United States manufacturing sector, roughly half of multi-factor productivity growth over
the course of a decade can be accounted for by the reallocation of outputs and inputs away from less productive to
more productive businesses” (Haltiwanger, 2000, p.4).
5“...4-digit industry eﬀects account for less than 10 percent of the cross-sectional heterogeneity in output, em-
ployment, capital equipment, capital structures, and productivity growth rates across establishments” (Haltiwanger,
2000, p.5).
4First, ¯-decomposition avoids the sectoral PPP-conversion-factor problem because it sidesteps
the question of sectoral convergence – whether productivity converges in each sector. To estimate
sectoral convergence, one needs to compare sectoral productivity levels across countries, which in
turns calls for sector-speciﬁc PPP-conversion factors. However, to estimate ¯-decomposition, one
only needs to compare (i) productivity growth and shares across industries and countries, and (ii)
aggregate – but not sectoral – productivity levels across countries. The expenditure PPPs for total
GDP are designed for exactly such broad-based comparisons.
Second, ¯-decomposition provides a complete account of the components that contribute to
convergence. The account consists of three components: The ﬁrst component measures how much
the productivity growth in each sector contributes to aggregate convergence. The second component
computes how much economic restructuring, measured by the shifts of employment across sectors,
contributes to convergence. The last component captures the interaction eﬀect between the ﬁrst
two components. Nothing is left out because these three components fully account for aggregate
productivity convergence.
With this method, I show that productivity growth in manufacturing and services accounted
for much of the absolute convergence in aggregate productivity among the OECD countries during
1970–90. This result is robust to the choice of base year. However, the contribution to convergence
due to reallocations across sectors turns out to be small.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes the ¯-decomposition
methodology and discusses its interpretations. Section 3 applies the method to the data. Section
4 conﬁrms robustness to the choice of base year. Section 5 concludes.
52 ¯-Decomposition: Accounting for Aggregate Productivity Con-
vergence
One of the stylized facts in the empirical growth literature is the ﬁnding of absolute convergence
among the OECD countries in the postwar period: economists typically ﬁnd a negative ¯ coeﬃcient
in the following convergence regression:
g(yi) = ¹ + ¯ lnyi0 + ²i; (1)
where yi is output per worker in country i, ¹ is the intercept, ¯ is the coeﬃcient estimate on the
logarithm of initial output per worker (lnyi0), ²i is an error term, and g(:) denotes growth rate.6
I refer to the ¯ coeﬃcient as aggregate convergence henceforth.7 Thus, to account for aggregate
convergence, the methodology I propose decomposes the ¯ coeﬃcient into a sum of the component
¯’s.
Using the shift-share decomposition identity ﬁrst proposed by Maddison (1952), aggregate pro-






































where y is aggregate output per worker, ®j is the initial output share of sector j in the economy,
yj is labor productivity in sector j, and sj is employment share of sector j.
Equation (2) decomposes aggregate productivity growth into the sum of three components over
k sectors: the ﬁrst component represents the growth eﬀect, i.e., the eﬀect of sectoral productivity
6This is also known as ¯-convergence for obvious reason.
7For more discussions on the issue of convergence, see, for example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), and Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
8See, for example, Van Art (1996) for a recent application using European data.
6improvements on aggregate growth, holding constant the employment structure of the economy;
equation (2) also shows that the growth eﬀect can be decomposed further into k components,
where each component measures the productivity growth in each of the k sectors, holding constant
employment structure and weighting each sector by its initial output share in the economy. The
second component shows the shift eﬀect, i.e., the eﬀect on growth due to reallocations of labor
across sectors, holding constant the relative productivity of each sector. The shift eﬀect is positive
or negative depending on whether sectors that are above average in productivity are increasing or
decreasing their shares of employment. The third component captures the interaction eﬀect, i.e.,
the covariance of the ﬁrst two components. This term is positive if sectors that increase productivity
more rapidly than average have increasing employment shares, and negative if these sectors have
declining employment shares.
Equations (1) and (2) explain the same object, i.e., aggregate productivity growth g(y). Com-
bining the right hand side of the two equations, one immediately sees that initial output per worker
(lnyi;t) must aﬀect the growth of output per worker (g(y)) through three channels: within-sector
productivity improvements (the growth eﬀect), between-sector reallocations (the shift eﬀect), and
their covariance (the interaction eﬀect). Substituting the shift-share decomposition identity (2)




¯Productivity Growth in Sector j + ¯Shift Effect + ¯Interaction Effect; (3)
where ¯ is the coeﬃcient estimate on the logarithm of initial output per worker in equation (1),
¯Productivity Growth in Sector j, ¯Shift Effect, and ¯Interaction Effect are the respective coeﬃcient esti-
mates if the output-weighted productivity growth in sector j, the shift eﬀect, and the interac-
tion eﬀect are used as the dependent variable in regression (1) instead.9 Equation (3) deﬁnes
9For example, consider the simplest linear estimator – the OLS estimator. Let X denotes an (n £ 2) regressor
matrix, where column (1) consists of the constant term and column (2) consists of the logarithm of initial output per
7¯-decomposition. It states that poorer countries may grow faster than the richer ones if they have
faster sectoral productivity growth, faster employment ﬂows into the more productive sectors, or a
combination of the ﬁrst two factors. Speciﬁcally, ¯Productivity Growth in Sector j measures contribution
to convergence from the productivity growth in sector j.
To illustrate, suppose that sector m · k is the manufacturing sector. A negative ¯m indicates
that poorer countries tend to grow faster than the richer ones in manufacturing productivity in their
transitions to the steady state. Thus, productivity growth in manufacturing must lead to aggregate
convergence. In contrast, a positive ¯m implies that it is the richer countries that experience faster
productivity growth in manufacturing. Thus, the productivity growth in manufacturing would
lead to divergence. Furthermore, the relative contribution of the manufacturing sector to aggregate
convergence is readily measured by ¯m=¯. If this ratio were close to zero in absolute value, then
the manufacturing sector could not have been an important sector behind aggregate productivity
convergence. The sector that has the most negative ratio ¯j=¯, j · k is the most important sector
contributing to aggregate productivity convergence.
The last two estimates – ¯Shift Effect and ¯Interaction Effect – show the eﬀect on convergence
due to between-sector reallocations and the interaction eﬀect. For example, a negative ¯Shift Effect
indicates faster inﬂows of workers into the more productive sectors in poorer countries. In this
case, economic restructuring would lead to aggregate productivity convergence. The interaction




0g(y). Substitute the expression for g(y) from equation (2)








































































°Productivity Growth in Sector j + °Shift Effect + °Interaction Effect
In particular, ¯ =
Pk
j=1 ¯Productivity Growth in Sector j + ¯Shift Effect + ¯Interaction Effect.
8eﬀect and ¯Interaction Effect are typically very close to zero, suggesting little eﬀect due to interaction
between productivity growth and employment shift.
This sectoral decomposition methodology does not depend on sectoral productivity-level com-
parison. It depends on the growth rates of sectoral productivity and sectoral shares. Although it
does depend on aggregate productivity-level comparison in the convergence regression, the existing
PPP measures are designed for exactly such broad-based comparison. Thus, it avoids the sectoral
PPP-conversion-factor problem highlighted by Sørensen (2001).10
With the ¯-decomposition in equation (3), it also becomes clear that the existing methodology
that focuses on sectoral convergence only allows us to infer convergence due to the growth eﬀect,
but not convergence due to the shift eﬀect and the interaction eﬀect. Indeed, Bernard and Jones
(1996b) argue that both convergence in output shares and convergence in sectoral productivity are
needed to ensure aggregate convergence. They test whether countries are becoming more similar in
output composition (see Bernard and Jones, 1996b, p1222 and p1225). They argue that since most
countries show similar trends in the output shares of manufacturing and services (the dominant
sectors) over time, they could concentrate on sectoral convergence in manufacturing and services.
This paper goes further by directly estimating whether and how much economic restructuring
contributes to aggregate convergence.
To perform ¯-decomposition in practice, I ﬁrst decompose the growth rate of output per worker
into the sectoral components using equation (2); I then successively regress these components on the
logarithm of initial output per worker and a constant. The ¯ coeﬃcient estimates obtained from the
successive regressions would measure the contributions to convergence from sectoral productivity
10Chad Jones pointed out that using the real output shares ®j’s in the shift-share decomposition may nevertheless
induce sectoral productivity-level comparison because ®j=(Yj=Y )real = (Yj=Y )nominal £ (P=Pj), where P and Pj
are the general and sectoral price levels respectively. However, as the robustness test later reveals, calculating output
shares using diﬀerent base year prices (from 1980 and 1990) do not change the conclusion that both manufacturing
and services are important in driving aggregate convergence.
9growth, between-sector restructuring, and their covariance respectively.
An important fact about industrial production in the OECD countries is the rise of the service
sector and the corresponding decline of manufacturing. I need to take this stylized fact into account
in the shift-share decomposition so that I do not overstate the importance of the manufacturing
sector and understate services. To do this, note that although the output shares ®’s are not constant
over extended periods of time, they are roughly constant between consecutive years because year-
to-year changes in the sectoral output shares are small. Consequently, to accommodate for changes
in sectoral output shares, I ﬁrst perform the shift-share decomposition for each year and then take
the average over the sample period that I consider.11
2.1 How Does This Relate to Microeconomic Studies Using Firm-Level Data?
To see how this relates to the ﬁrm-level studies, note that equation (2) is the equation that Baily,
Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (1996) use to decompose the productivity growth in manufacturing
into contributions due to productivity growth within individual ﬁrms, changes in employment
shares across ﬁrms, and their covariance. Other microeconomic studies use very similar forms (see
Griliches and Regev (1995), and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2000)). Thus, these studies
essentially apply the shift-share decomposition once more to the sectoral productivity growth, i.e.,
the ﬁrst k terms in equation (2). They focus almost exclusively on manufacturing, with a few
exceptions on selected service industries.
In other words, this paper provides an intermediate link between aggregate growth and ﬁrm-
level growth within the same sectors. It emphasizes that an integrated and comprehensive industrial
account for the growth of GDP per worker results from ﬁrst decomposing aggregate productivity
growth into sectoral productivity growth and restructuring across sectors, and then relating sectoral
11An alternative is to use average shares over the period.
10productivity growth to productivity growth of individual ﬁrms and restructuring across ﬁrms within
the same industries. For example, this framework can be used to investigate the role of restructuring
across ﬁrms within narrowly deﬁned industries in sectoral convergence. However, empirically such
exercises are not yet feasible as we are still far from a complete industrial account of aggregate
growth. Microeconomic ﬁrm-level studies in industries outside manufacturing are just beginning.
Nevertheless, this framework provides a useful road map for thinking about these research.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 The Data and The Sample
The basic data source is the OECD International Sectoral Database (ISDB).12 The empirical work
in this section employs industrial production data for seven sectors in 13 OECD countries over the
period 1970–1990, essentially the same sample used by Bernard and Jones (1996). The seven sectors
I include are agriculture, construction, manufacturing, mining, services, utilities, and government
plus other non-market producers.13 The 13 countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.14
Unless otherwise stated, all of the currency-denominated variables are in 1990 dollars, having
been converted into US$ using 1990 expenditure purchasing-power parities (PPP’s) for GDP. I
measure labor productivity as value-added per worker, and the number of worker as total employ-
12See OECD Statistical Compendium (1999).
13All the sectoral classiﬁcations are taken directly from the ISDB except the services aggregate. In the ISDB,
agriculture is AGR, construction is CST, manufacturing is MAN, mining is MID, utilities is EGW, government is
PGS, and other non-market producers are OPR. The service sector is constructed by summing retail trade (RET),
transportation/communication (TRS), ﬁnance/real estate (FNI), and community/personal services (SOC). The total
is given by TET, which is also used to calculate sectoral shares.
14The Netherlands is excluded because it has missing values in services, a substantial component of total output.
Although Italy and Belgium have missing values in mining, they are included as mining activities tend to be negligible
and unimportant in the OECD countries. Finally, note that Germany has missing values for employment in the FNI
sector for all years in the sample.
11ment.15 Admittedly, with only thirteen observations, it is meaningless to discuss the statistical
signiﬁcance of the estimates. Instead, I focus on re-assessing the ﬁndings of Bernard and Jones
(1996) using the ¯-decomposition methodology and the economic signiﬁcance of the estimates.
Table 1 shows the average output shares by country and sector for the period 1970–1990. The
service sector was the dominant sector, producing an average of 45 percent of total output during
1970–1990. Manufacturing was on average about half the size of services, producing 22 percent
of output. Government and other non-market producers were the third largest sector, producing
16 percent of output. Because outputs from this sector typically have no market prices and are
produced with non-proﬁt considerations, it is meaningless to discuss productivity growth in this
sector. Thus, I ignore this sector in what follows. For the remaining sectors, average output shares
were 3 percent for agriculture, 7 percent for construction, 2 percent for mining, and 3 percent for
utilities respectively.
Table 2 shows the shift-share decomposition of aggregate productivity growth by country during
1970–1990 using equation (2). It turns out that the growth eﬀect made up the bulk of aggregate
productivity growth, although the shift eﬀect was also non-trivial in some countries. Interaction
eﬀect was negligible in all cases. Speciﬁcally, for the whole sample, output per worker grew at an
average rate of 2 percent per year, of which 1.65 percentage points came from sectoral productivity
growth, 0.20 percentage points from between-sector employment restructuring, and -0.03 percentage
points from their covariance. Some residual growth – 0.17 percentage points – were unaccounted for
because of data omission in the ISDB, i.e., the sum of outputs of the seven sectors that I explicitly
consider is less than the aggregate output reported in the ISDB.16
Total growth eﬀect was positive for all countries, reﬂecting that sectoral productivity growth
15Value added and total employment are classiﬁed as GDPD and ET respectively in the ISDB.
16If outputs in the seven sectors did add up to the aggregate output reported in the ISDB, then there would be no
residual and the decomposition identity would hold exactly.
12contributed importantly to aggregate productivity growth. Total shift eﬀect was also positive in
all countries except Sweden. This means that sectors that were above average in productivity
generally increased their shares of employment. Total interaction eﬀect was negative for most
countries, suggesting that sectors that were improving productivity more rapidly than average had
decreasing employment shares. This ﬁnding is less surprising than it may appear and it need not
imply any ineﬃciency; microeconomic ﬁrm-level studies often ﬁnd that employment downsizing of
a continuing business often accompanies large productivity gains.17
Table 3 further decomposes the growth eﬀect into the productivity growth due to each sector,
weighted by the sector’s output share. It turns out that the manufacturing sector had the largest
output weighted productivity growth. It was followed by services. Out of the 1.65 percentage points
attributable to the growth eﬀect, manufacturing and services contributed 0.66 and 0.58 percentage
points respectively. The large contribution by manufacturing is particularly astonishing since the
manufacturing sector was only about half the size of services in terms of output.18
3.2 Did the Manufacturing Sector Contribute to Convergence?
In this section, I estimate how much the productivity growth in each sector contributed to con-
vergence in aggregate productivity using the ¯-decomposition in equation (3). Table 4 reports the
results. Row (12) shows that aggregate output per worker converged at 2.46 percent per year. The
preceding rows show the component ¯’s. The service sector turns out to be the most important
sector driving aggregate convergence. Out of the 2.46 percentage points, it accounted for 0.59
17For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2000) argue that some technological innovations – such as the shift
from large integrated mills to more specialized mini mills in the steel industry – may lead to substantial downsizing
by plants that adopt the new technology. Furthermore, Haltiwanger (2000) points out that employment downsizing
may reﬂect a restructuring involving increasing capital intensity and perhaps skill intensity that lead to improvement
in labor productivity. However, these studies generally ﬁnd that net entry of businesses does tend to increase labor
productivity growth.
18It is worth emphasizing that since these are annual growth rates calculated using output shares in the previous
year and then averaged over the sample period, they have already incorporated the long term trends of industrial
production – declining output shares of manufacturing and increasing shares of services.
13percentage points, or ((0.59/2.46)£100%=) 24 percent of aggregate convergence.
The manufacturing sector was the second largest contributor to convergence. In particular,
it contributed 0.42 percentage points, or ((0.42/2.46)£100%=) 17 percent of aggregate conver-
gence. It was followed by agriculture and construction. Each contributed 0.25 percentage points,
or ((0.25/2.46)£100%=) 10 percent of total convergence. The mining sector contributed another
0.17 percentage points, or ((0.17/2.46)£100%=) 7 percent of the total. The contributions to
convergence by agriculture, construction, and mining were more than proportional to their out-
put shares. Productivity growth from other sectors – non-market and utilities – had little eﬀect
on aggregate convergence. In sum, the growth eﬀect accounted for 1.78 percentage points, or
((1.78/2.46)£100%=) 72 percent of aggregate convergence.
Figure 1 illustrates ¯-decomposition of the growth eﬀect. The horizontal axis is the logarithm of
initial output per worker. The vertical axis plots the sectoral productivity growth. A negative slope
implies that productivity growth in that sector contributed to convergence, i.e., poorer countries
experienced faster productivity growth in that sector. A more negative slope implies a greater
contribution, for instance, in manufacturing and services.
In summary, productivity growth in services and manufacturing was what drove aggregate pro-
ductivity convergence among these 13 OECD countries during 1970–90. Together, they accounted
for about 40 percent of aggregate productivity convergence, or ((0.59+0.42)£100%/1.78=) 57 per-
cent of the growth eﬀect. Finally, it is worth noting that although the manufacturing sector was
on average only half the size of services, its productivity contribution to convergence was more
than two-thirds of the contribution of services. Thus, productivity growth in manufacturing did
contribute considerably to convergence.
143.3 Did Between-Sector Restructuring Contribute to Convergence?
The contribution to convergence from the shift eﬀect turns out to be small. The estimate in
Table 4 shows that it accounted for 0.33 percentage points, or only ((0.33/2.46)£100%=) 13% of
aggregate convergence. The interaction eﬀect fails to explain the tendency to converge, contributing
only 0.03 percentage points to aggregate convergence. Thus, while between-sector restructuring did
have some eﬀect on aggregate productivity convergence, what really drove convergence was sectoral
productivity growth, especially productivity growth in manufacturing and services.
Figure 2 shows the ¯-decomposition of aggregate convergence. The horizontal axis is again the
logarithm of initial output per worker. The vertical axes plot the growth eﬀect, the shift eﬀect, the
interaction eﬀect, and the aggregate productivity growth respectively. Clearly, the contribution of
the growth eﬀect is the most pronounced.
Finally, some small residual eﬀect, 0.32 percentage points, remain unaccounted for. As explained
earlier, it arises because of data omissions in the ISDB: the seven sectors that I explicitly consider
add up to less than the aggregate output reported in the ISDB. The residual eﬀect captures anything
not explicitly recorded in the ISDB. Hence, it is void of economic interpretation.
4 Robustness Checks for Base Year Eﬀect
The above calculations use 1990 as the base year.19 A natural question is whether the results are
indeed robust to the choice of base year. To investigate this, I perform two robustness tests.
In the ﬁrst test, I re-estimate the shift-share decomposition and ¯-decomposition using data
with 1980 as the base year. I then compare them to those obtained using data with 1990 as the
base year.20 This is a comprehensive test for the base year eﬀect because I re-estimate both growth
19Base year refers to the year in which the ﬁxed prices originate.
20In other words, I re-estimate both equations (2) and (3) using output data measured in diﬀerent base year prices.
Thus, I ask whether the growth decomposition in equation (2) and the ¯-decomposition in equation (3) are robust
15and convergence decompositions using diﬀerent base year prices.
The data that use 1980 as the base year come from an earlier version of the ISDB – the one that
Bernard and Jones (1996b) use. I change the sample period to 1970–85 because most data ended
in 1987 in this version of the ISDB and there were some missing values in 1986–87. Panel A and
B in Table 5 report ¯-decompositions obtained with 1980 and 1990 as the base year respectively.
It turns out that in both cases, the manufacturing and service sectors consistently emerge as the
most important sectors driving aggregate productivity convergence.
Not surprisingly, the absolute magnitudes of the estimates do depend on the choice of base
year. For example, aggregate output per worker converged at 2.77 or 2.32 percent depending
on which base year prices are used. Similarly, productivity growth in the manufacturing sector
contributed either 0.65 or 0.40 percentage points depending on the base year chosen. However, what
matters here is that the manufacturing sector contributed importantly to aggregate productivity
convergence in both cases. Using 1980 as the base year, manufacturing accounted for ((0.65/2.77)
£100%=) 23 percent of aggregate convergence. Similarly, with 1990 as the base year, it explained
((0.40/2.32)£100%=) 17 percent of the tendency to converge.
Equally important, the service sector continues to drive aggregate convergence. It accounted
for either ((0.65/2.77)£100%=) 23 or ((0.51/2.32)£100%=) 22 percent of aggregate convergence,
depending on the base year chosen. The results for the other sectors are also robust to the choice of
base year. Similarly, the contribution from between-sector restructuring remains small. Total shift
eﬀect explained either ((0.33/2.77)£100%=) 12 or ((0.29/2.32) £100%=) 13 percent of aggregate
convergence. The contribution of the interaction eﬀect is negligible in both cases. Thus, the
decompositions appear robust to the choice of base year.
The second robustness test investigates whether the choice of base year aﬀects ¯-decomposition
to base year eﬀect.
16through the measurement of initial output per worker. Speciﬁcally, I follow Sørensen’s (2001)
procedures to construct measures of initial output per worker using prices for each base year
between 1970 and 1991.21 I then repeatedly substitute these measures into the right hand side of
the regression to obtain ¯-decompositions for diﬀerent base years. However, the dependent variable
– the growth decomposition – continues to use 1990 as the base year.22 Sørensen’s procedures are
not used to estimate growth decompositions for diﬀerent base years because they are based on
backward extrapolation using growth rates.
The only level comparison this methodology makes is very broad-based – that for aggregate
output per worker. It does not compare sectoral productivity levels across countries. Therefore,
the expenditure PPPs for total GDP are the correct conversion factors to use. Thus, a priori, one
does not expect the results to be sensitive to the conversion-factor problem identiﬁed by Sørensen
(2001).
Figure 3 summarizes the robustness checks for ¯-decomposition of the growth eﬀect, and Figure
4 the robustness checks for ¯-decomposition of the aggregate convergence. The horizontal axis is
the base years used to measure the initial output per worker. The solid line shows the corresponding
¯ estimates, while the two dotted lines plot the 95 percent conﬁdence interval. Since the lines are
ﬂat for all sectors and for all growth components, these plots conﬁrm that the ¯ estimates are
indeed extremely robust to this consistency test.
In summary, the results are robust to the choice of base year. Although the absolute magnitudes
of the estimates do change slightly when diﬀerent base year prices are used, it is worth emphasizing
that both manufacturing and services always emerge as the most important sectors that drove
21For details on the procedures I use to construct outputs measured in diﬀerent base years, see Sørensen (2001,
p1162).
22In other words, this test investigates robustness with respect to right hand side of the convergence regression. It
does not ask whether the growth decomposition in equation (2) might be sensitive to base year eﬀect, i.e., robustness
with respect to left hand side of the convergence regression. In contrast, the ﬁrst test examines robustness on both
sides of the convergence regression.
17aggregate productivity convergence.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a methodology – ¯-decomposition – to investigate whether and how much
manufacturing and services contributed to aggregate productivity convergence among the OECD
countries during 1970–1990. There are three main ﬁndings. First, the evidence suggests that
sectoral productivity growth, especially in manufacturing and services, was the most important
contributor to aggregate convergence. In other words, poorer countries caught up to richer ones
through productivity improvements in both manufacturing and services.
Second, employment shifts across broadly deﬁned sectors had limited impact on aggregate
convergence. The process of employment restructuring across sectors was only slightly faster in
poorer countries. However, the results say nothing about resource reallocations among ﬁrms within
the same sector. Haltiwanger (2000) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000) point out that recent
research using establishment and ﬁrm-level data has shown large-scale, ongoing reallocation of
outputs and inputs across individual producers within sector. They show that these within-sector
reallocations contributed signiﬁcantly to sectoral productivity growth. Whether and how much
these within-sector reallocations contributed to aggregate and sectoral productivity convergence are
empirical questions that remain to be answered by future research. However, based on the ﬁndings
of existing ﬁrm-level studies, it seems plausible that within-sector restructuring will emerge as an
important driving force behind convergence.
Third, the methodology of ¯-decomposition and its ﬁndings are robust to the base year eﬀect
that Sørensen (2001) highlights. Though comforting, it is worth noting that Sørensen’s (2001)
consistency tests are based on necessary but not suﬃcient conditions.
18The methodology I propose only examines the contribution of each sector to aggregate produc-
tivity convergence. It does not answer the question of whether there was productivity convergence
within each sector across countries – the original Bernard and Jones’s question. To answer that
question conclusively, one indeed needs to compare sectoral productivity levels across countries,
which is not possible without the correct sector-speciﬁc PPP conversion factors. To the extent that
sectoral productivity growth was what drove aggregate convergence, one is tempted to infer that
sectoral productivity did converge across countries. Though intuitive, this inference may not be
straightforward. Thus, whether sectoral productivity did converge remains an empirical question
to be addressed when the correct sectoral PPP conversion factors become available.
Finally, the use of labor productivity, instead of multifactor productivity, does restrict the
depth of analysis, as a change in labor productivity confounds potential changes in technology
and factor accumulation. However, calculating multifactor productivity at the sectoral level is
unwieldy because it is diﬃcult to obtain accurate measures of capital stocks for each sector over
an extended period of time. In addition, it is unclear what the factor shares should be for diﬀerent
sectors. However, applying a similar channel accounting methodology to the aggregate data, Wong
(2002) ﬁnds that it is total factor productivity (TFP) growth, not factor accumulation, that drives
conditional convergence in aggregate output per worker. One expects similar patterns to hold also
at the sectoral level. Furthermore, based on the ﬁndings of Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1994) on
manufacturing plants, one expects much of the TFP growth at the plant level to take the form of
within-sector across-plant reallocations.
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22Table 2: Shift-Share Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity Growth, 1970–90 (%)
Growth Shift Interaction Residual Growth in Output
Country Eﬀect Eﬀect Eﬀect Eﬀect per Worker
1 AUSTRALIA 1.15 0.08 -0.07 0.15 1.31
2 BELGIUM 2.03 0.06 -0.04 0.32 2.37
3 CANADA 0.81 0.02 -0.06 0.1 0.87
4 DENMARK 1.6 0.08 -0.03 0.19 1.84
5 FINLAND 2.6 0.31 -0.02 0.02 2.92
6 FRANCE 2.17 0.34 -0.01 0.05 2.55
7 GERMANY 1.96 0.2 0 0.04 2.19
8 ITALY 1.53 0.42 -0.02 0.17 2.1
9 JAPAN 2.29 0.58 0 0.63 3.5
10 NORWAY 1.8 0.29 0.01 0.2 2.29
11 SWEDEN 1.55 -0.08 -0.03 0.06 1.5
12 U.K. 1.29 0.16 -0.05 0.32 1.72
13 U.S.A. 0.73 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.81
Average 1.65 0.20 -0.03 0.17 2.00
Note: Residual Eﬀect = Aggregate Productivity Growth - Growth Eﬀect - Shift Eﬀect - Interaction Eﬀect. It


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24Table 4: ¯-Decomposition of Aggregate Convergence During 1970–90
Sector ¯ S.E. N R2
1 Agriculture -0.25 0.08 13 0.47
2 Construction -0.24 0.08 13 0.41
3 Manufacturing -0.42 0.31 13 0.14
4 Mining -0.17 0.21 11 0.07
5 Services -0.59 0.27 13 0.3
6 Utilities 0.01 0.09 13 0
7 Non-Market Producers -0.11 0.08 13 0.14
8 Total Growth Eﬀect -1.78 0.49 13 0.54
9 Total Shift Eﬀect -0.33 0.21 13 0.18
10 Total Interaction Eﬀect -0.03 0.03 13 0.11
11 Residual Eﬀect -0.32 0.2 13 0.18
12 Aggregate Convergence -2.46 0.68 13 0.55
Notes: The dependent variable in each row is the respective component of growth from the shift-share decomposition
in equation (2). The regressors include only an intercept and the logarithm of initial output per worker in 1970. ¯
is coeﬃcient estimate on the logarithm of initial output per worker. Total output is given by TET in the ISDB.
Netherlands is excluded from all regressions because it has missing values in value-added in most service industries
in 1970. Belgium and Italy are excluded in the regression for mining sector because they have missing values in this




c The residual eﬀect is due to data omission in the ISDB.
25Table 5: Robustness Check I – ¯-decomposition of Aggregate Convergence During 1970–1985
A. Base Year 1980
Sector ¯ S.E. No. of Obs. R2
1 Agriculture -0.28 0.09 12 0.5
2 Construction -0.11 0.13 12 0.07
3 Manufacturing -0.65 0.42 12 0.19
4 Mining -0.26 0.28 11 0.09
5 Services -0.65 0.23 12 0.45
6 Utilities -0.01 0.05 12 0
7 Non-Market Producers -0.2 0.13 12 0.18
8 Total Growth Eﬀect -2.17 0.45 12 0.7
9 Total Shift Eﬀect -0.33 0.2 12 0.2
10 Total Interaction Eﬀect -0.07 0.04 12 0.24
11 Residual Eﬀect -0.2 0.27 12 0.05
12 Aggregate Convergence -2.77 0.62 12 0.66
B. Base Year 1990
Sector ¯ S.E. No. of Obs. R2
1 Agriculture -0.26 0.08 13 0.5
2 Construction -0.17 0.12 13 0.15
3 Manufacturing -0.4 0.33 13 0.12
4 Mining -0.2 0.16 11 0.15
5 Services -0.51 0.27 13 0.24
6 Utilities -0.03 0.08 13 0.02
7 Non-Market Producers -0.11 0.12 13 0.07
8 Total Growth Eﬀect -1.68 0.50 13 0.5
9 Total Shift Eﬀect -0.29 0.22 13 0.14
10 Total Interaction Eﬀect -0.04 0.03 13 0.13
11 Residual Eﬀect -0.3 0.21 13 0.16
12 Aggregate Convergence -2.32 0.66 13 0.52
Notes: The dependent variable in each row is the respective component of growth from the shift-share decomposition
in equation (2). The regressors include only an intercept and the logarithm of initial output per worker in 1970. ¯
is coeﬃcient estimate on the logarithm of initial output per worker. Total output is given by TET in the ISDB.
Netherlands is excluded from all regressions because it has missing values in value-added in most service industries
in 1970. Belgium and Italy are excluded in the regression for mining sector because they have missing values in this




c The residual eﬀect is due to data omission in the ISDB.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Figure 4: Robustness Check II – Shift-Share Decomposition of Aggregate Convergence (Base Years
1970–1991)
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